University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

1-1-2009

A stirring alphabet of thought: review essay
Marcelo Svirsky
University of Wollongong, msvirsky@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Svirsky, Marcelo, A stirring alphabet of thought: review essay 2009, 311-324.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/1320

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Review Essay
A Stirring Alphabet of Thought

Marcelo Svirsky

Cardiff University

José Gil (2008) O Imperceptível Devir da Imanência – Sobre a Filosofia
de Deleuze, Lisbon: Relógio D’Água.
One might interpret and explain the great philosophers as one pleases,
but an honest interpretation must not smother the soul of their oeuvres,
however much one may admire or criticise them. Many would agree that
Deleuze’s writing is often obscure and difficult, and therefore the attempt
to introduce some clarity through interpretation must be welcomed.
However, too much order can compromise the delicate mechanism of
his work and literally freeze its internal dynamics when, for example,
concepts and planes of thought are arranged without regard for their
links and junctures. In the case of Deleuze, it seems that if anything
must be respected, it is the sense of constant movement through the
connections that he was able to forge for the benefit of philosophy.
This movement is related first and foremost to his critical dwelling
on the dogmatic image of thought, which Nietzsche was undoubtedly
instrumental in fostering, as Deleuze himself describes in the preface to
the English translation of Nietzsche and Philosophy:
And without doubt this is the most important point of Nietzsche’s
philosophy: the radical transformation of the image of thought that we create
for ourselves. Nietzsche snatches thought from the element of truth and
falsity. He turns it into an interpretation and an evaluation, interpretation of
forces, evaluation of power. It is a thought-movement, not merely in the sense
that Nietzsche wants to reconcile thought and concrete movements, but in the
sense that thought itself must produce movements, bursts of extraordinary
speed and slowness. (Deleuze 1986: xii; emphasis mine)

Deleuze’s diagram is perhaps an apposite concept in this respect: as
Williams explains, ‘a Deleuzian diagram is an apparatus expressing
a series of dynamic transformations . . . these movements are not
displacements of things as the effect of forces, but changes in things
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as they move and encounter others’ (Williams 2008: 79). This constant
movement evades the very possibility of capture for the sake of
recognition, representation, or static identity. And it is here that José
Gil’s book scores a major achievement: his writing ties in neatly with
Deleuze’s agility, because he chooses to interpret Deleuze as a thinker
of movement, one who manipulates philosophical concepts, problems
and ideas by alternately pushing them away, turning and twisting
them this way and that, beyond their intended boundaries, and beyond
their previous identities. With Deleuze, there is always a ‘Deleuzian
movement’ of thought. Thus, for Gil, we always find in Deleuze ‘a
movement of torsion that immediately allows us to contemplate a sphere
of difference’ (Gil 2008: 30).1 Viewing thinking as a motion means
it is a potentiality – and therefore an action and a critique without
transcendent referents (Gil 2008: 166–7). But this torsion of concepts2 is
done not merely for the sake of creating new concepts, but also for the
purpose of defining a new field of experience and thought, one marked
by excess – that is, beyond the bare empirical exercise of the faculties
(Gil 2008: 64–5). And to this end, a proper ‘pedagogy of the senses’ is
required: to educate the senses to discern that which is transcendentally
insensible.
But it is more – it is also a matter of language. There is something
particularly agile in Gil’s Portuguese Deleuze. Perhaps it is the Latin
kinship with the French that explains this airy and lyrical version, the
sense of the French rhythms. The rhythm and sense of anticipation that
Gil’s Portuguese instils in Deleuze’s philosophy lift the written word
above the idiomatic technicalities and rigidities that occasionally stem
the flow of Deleuze’s prose in other languages. In this respect, Gil keeps
the reading in flux, in a state of constant becoming. And yet, in spite
of Gil’s aspirations, this book cannot be considered an introduction to
Deleuze’s thought. Although he carefully explores Deleuze’s complicated
concepts and ideas and offers a rich interpretative language, Gil also
does not refrain from embarking upon the complicated task of offering
a micro-dynamic of Deleuze’s body of thought, thus rendering his book
less suitable for novice readers of Deleuze. This is increasingly apparent
as one progresses through the book and witnesses Gil’s evident mastery
of the broad material written by Deleuze (and Guattari), and his ability
to crisscross at will the length and breadth of Deleuze’s work, and
make connections between what he judges to be the different stages
and transformations of Deleuze’s concepts (Gil 2008: 178). However,
in one respect, the book is introductory, in that it is not a work in which
Deleuze’s thought is applied to specific problems in philosophy, politics
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or any other field. It is an interpretative work of Deleuze’s thought and,
seen in perspective, Gil serves as Deleuze’s conceptual biographer.
Covering Deleuze’s works from before and after his volumes on
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Gil greatly expands upon the notion of
the plane of immanence as the ontological axis of Deleuze’s thought,
in a way more suited to experienced readers of the genre. Nonetheless,
his writing is clear and makes for pleasant and fluent reading. Thus,
for example, as he puts it, the process of learning – as explained in
Difference and Repetition – is ‘the discordant exercise of the faculties
divorced (disconnected) from every form of identity’ (Gil 2008: 34). In
other words, for Gil the activity of learning is something that can never
be achieved, but rather only be the focus of constant experimentation.

I. Introduction
Before considering the main arguments of Gil’s book, a few preliminary
comments are in order. As noted, central to its theme is a Deleuzian
exploration of the transcendental conditions of the plane of immanence.3
To this end, Gil explores the realm in which the conditions for
thinking and of real experimentation must be found (thereby underlining
Deleuze’s distance from transcendental Kantianism, in which these are
regarded as mere replications of the empirical). But what exactly do
these conditions point to? They allude to the ‘invisible which is stronger
than the visible forms’, Gil argues – to the sub-representative realm of
singularities, that is, to the virtual (Gil 2008: 63–4).
According to Gil, Deleuze developed his problematisations through
two lines of inquiry. The first was induced by his desire to follow in
the footsteps of other great philosophers, from Aristotle to Husserl,
to ‘rescue the sensible’ – but in defiance of tradition, rather than with
it. This in turn led to the second, more positive, line of inquiry,
in which Deleuze set out to present ‘the sensible, or the concrete’
as something that is beyond what our physical senses might grasp
as concrete. This ‘beyond’ is defined by Gil as ‘the insensible that
only may be felt, the unimaginable that only can be imagined’ (Gil
2008: 14). It is a terminology that he adopts to designate singularity
in concrete experience, that which embodies difference itself. The
insensible, however, can only be generated in a field that is distinct
from the comparative field of the empirical: it is there that we find the
Deleuzian transcendental conditions of experience. For Gil, Deleuze’s
lines of philosophical inquiry compelled him to build – primarily
from Difference and Repetition to The Logic of Sense – a supportive

314 Marcelo Svirsky
topological ontology of difference that connects the concept of repetition
with an original reading of the eternal return, culminating in the plane
of immanence in his later works with Guattari.
But how exactly does repetition ‘open up’ the future as a dimension
of creation? To put it another way, where lies the habitat of difference?
According to Gil, it is the depth of the spatial texture of the eternal
return (as opposed to Plato’s false depth) or the texture of immanence,
which guarantees the logic of excess, the ‘produçao do novo’ (Gil 2008:
60). Without this ontology, Deleuze would be unable to offer a dynamic
of thought based on nomadic distributions (and away from sedentary
distributions of analogy) with which life may be re-thought. As Deleuze
writes in the last pages of Difference and Repetition:
Repetition in the eternal return appears under all these aspects as the peculiar
power of difference, and the displacement and disguise of that which repeats
only reproduce the divergence and the decentring of the different in a single
movement of diaphora or transport. The eternal return affirms difference; it
affirms dissemblance and disparateness, chance, multiplicity and becoming.
(Deleuze 1994: 300)

II. Structure and Main Arguments
Over ten chapters and an appendix, Gil’s book revolves around the ways
in which Deleuze presented a new style of thought, one never anchored
in a model or an image. For Gil, Deleuze created a revolutionary
alphabet of thought, one always in flux, averting nodes of sedimentation
and creating lines of flight. The Deleuzian alphabet of thought is the
medium through which we learn to think – it is his ‘conceptual machine’,
with movement as the only vehicle within this medium. This alphabet
is also of the field of virtual singularities from which a calculus is
forged, and a grammar or a language comes into being in different
domains (Gil 2008: 40–2). How does it move and change? While the
alphabet’s letters are the conditions of intelligibility of the Idea4 – the
elements articulated by the dice in every throw – these conditions change
in the face of new problems that emerge with every throw (in every
domain). Here the letters must be understood not literally, but as the
changing elements of the alphabet, which in turn animates thought.
It is an infinite alphabet in terms of its potential combinations: there
are always new integrations of letters – ‘a genuine machine for the
creation of concepts’ (Gil 2008: 42). It follows that the Deleuzian
alphabet is not a fixed model of construction, but a constantly moving
machine of differenciation: ‘dislocation of terms, corrections of concepts,
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abandonment and adjunctions of other notions – indicating how the
alphabet experiences transformations from one text to another, from
one work to another’ (Gil 2008: 42) (here Gil expands upon Deleuze’s
concepts, as for example, with the ‘Idea’ in Difference and Repetition
and its evolution to the ‘Event’ in The Logic of Sense).
How does this alphabet of thought move one to create and
perceive difference? Broadly speaking, Gil answers by structuring and
connecting Deleuze’s fundamental concepts in the following elliptical
and centrifugal fashion: to begin with, a thought of this kind is one
of excess, since it always takes itself to its limits; second, multiple
logics of excess (life and death, freeing blockades and auto-destruction)
are found in what is engendered by the connection and disjunction
of divergent series; third, a ‘beyond’ the organic and the empirical, in
which excess or difference circulates and therefore must be localised
and described; fourth, this ‘beyond’ is given by the n dimensions of the
plane of immanence; fifth, immanence follows the logic of potentiality,
the strategy of reciprocal determination between the virtual and the
actual (or between sense and the expressed), works from within desire
and gives it a plane in which to operate; sixth, and therefore, what
emerges is delirious reality (‘history is delirium’), so immanence is the
ontological texture of the real; seventh, the texture of the plane depends
on the matter of expression (thought, writing, dancing, etc.), and its
transformation (or becoming) is conditioned by rhythmic connections
and by consistency between heterogeneous forces; eighth, agency is
about microscopic processes of becoming, and not a model to follow
(here we find a pillar in Deleuze’s significant revolution of thought); and
finally, since Deleuzian thought is rhizomatic, it is a thought of excess.
What is a thought of excess? For Gil (Chapter 3),5 in terms of
syntheses of time, excess means to regard the future as the ontological
dimension of the new, as an empty form that allows for forgetting and
connecting (the task of the eternal return). In terms of energy, excess
liberates that which is buried by blockades – unfolded by an inequality
or difference in intensities (like erupting volcanoes).
Gil argues that Deleuze’s treatment of excess evolves through two
different stages. How can we break with the false entropic system with
which the world is represented and liberate the intensities? According
to Gil, in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense Deleuze
introduces excess as an augmentation of forces that rupture the systems
of common sense and the doxa – a norm attacked by a movement of
dissolution. Therefore, thought is reterritorialised with a flux of excess
breaking with that which it imprisons. Up to this point, it might be said
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that the logic of excess operates in a sort of action–reaction fashion,
since the line of flight appears as a result of the violence exerted by
the excess of external forces. But according to Gil, this logic of thought
abruptly changes, to the point where he is able to distinguish between a
‘First thought and a Second thought of Deleuze’ (Gil 2008: 202). From A
Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari put forward a different image
of the world: here excess is a part of all systems, creating lines of flight
and war machines. The world is machinic at every level or plateau. There
is no excess relative to a norm, since every norm is already distorted by
a war machine, meaning that there is no state apparatus without lines of
flight. Therefore, there is excess everywhere. In other words, the change
in A Thousand Plateaus in relation to Difference and Repetition and
The Logic of Sense is given by a movement of thought, which introduces
immanence within the actual texture of the concepts. This is to the
benefit of connectivity, since the tempo of incessant movements within
concepts allows not only for internal modifications of components, but
mainly for an in between (or opening) to connect across concepts (Gil
2008: 80). But with the advantages, Gil warns, there are also dangers:
an excess of excess might appear when immanence is introduced within
the texture of the concepts, thus ‘an escalation in the flux of variation
outlives a boundary, making the flux homogeneous’ (Gil 2008: 83).
This mechanism, says Gil, explains micro-fascisms and why desire turns
against itself, and why the line of flight loses its power of becoming.
The argument goes like this: from the plane of immanence in which
everything is in circulation, at certain rhythms and conjugations the
plane can be filled with energy of just one type (hate, love, etc.).
The excess of this type of energy is equivalent to a drastic reduction
in the potential of the bodies (homogenisation takes place) and of
heterogeneity. In summary, the excess of energy in the plane of
immanence, as excess without limits, transforms the lines of flight (the
trajectories of the singularities) into lines of impasse and destruction,
and as a result, the power of becoming is lost.
As an example of the transformation of lines of flight into lines of
destruction, Gil cites Fernando Pessoa’s schizophrenic writing. Pessoa,
on whom Gil has written two books and several articles, is one of the
most celebrated Portuguese poets. Writing as Alvaro de Campos (one
of Pessoa’s many heteronyms), Pessoa gives us an image of destruction:
‘the self-multitude, producer of multiplicities . . . who multiplies through
infinite forms of sense and infinite selves – freezes into an immutable
and self-destructive unity’ (Gil 2008: 84). The destructive movement
is from a centrifugal movement to a centripetal and unifying one,
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converging onto the self-individual, emerging after the struggle with the
self-multitude. Thus, we have multiple logics of excess: a line of flight
might stop blocking concepts, but it might also lead to self-destruction.
To some extent, Deleuze’s criticism of Platonism in Difference and
Repetition undermines Gil’s argument regarding the change in Deleuze’s
thought. On the one hand, Deleuze attacked the dogmatic image of
thought in Plato with an external movement of dissolution, to unblock
concepts. But on the other hand, for Deleuze the touchstone of Platonism
is also its undoing, with Plato himself providing the ammunition. In
other words, Deleuze found in Plato an internal war machine that allows
for transformation. Although ‘Platonism as a whole is erected on the
basis of the desire to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra that are
identified with the Sophist’ (Deleuze 1994: 127), it is the distinction
between the two kinds of images (and not between the original and the
image) – the copy and the simulacra – that seems to Deleuze to be the
decisive junction of a philosophical decision which could have ended
otherwise: namely, the decision as to which model Plato chose. The
simulacra are the false pretenders, ‘demonic images’ according to Plato,
not eligible for inclusion in the system that measures the copy against
the identity of the original Idea. ‘Does this not mean, however, that if
simulacra themselves refer to a model, it is one which is not endowed
with the ideal identity of the Same but, on the contrary, is a model of the
Other, an other model, the model of difference in itself from which flows
that interiorized dissimilitude?’ (Deleuze 1994: 128) Yes, is Deleuze’s
answer: Plato had sown both models, of the identity of the Same and
the resemblance of the Similar on the one hand, and of the terrifying
dissimilar on the other. He opted for the former, but also provided the
means for criticising this choice, which Deleuze saw and seized upon.
Divergent series (composed of intensities) are in relative displacement,
explains Gil, implying a differential correspondence between the
elements of the series, a disequilibrium, which is the excess of one series
over other (Chapter 4). The emphasis here is on the communication
between the series, given that it is through this connection that the
excess of forces circulate. This connective element is the ‘dark precursor’
of Difference and Repetition or ‘the empty square’ of The Logic of
Sense. It is an intensive element and an active difference. Fernando
Pessoa himself, for example, is the dark precursor in his oeuvres:
he communicates across the series and assembles the heteronyms
through their edges, their margins. This is the significant function
of the empty square – its circulation across the series in the structure
and the attendant displacement of frontiers – or, in other words, it

318 Marcelo Svirsky
is also the significant function of the structure which ‘is in fact a
machine for the production of incorporeal sense’ (Deleuze 1990: 71).
The dark precursor as embodiment of difference is decentred, outside
itself, dislocated, in constant movement (Gil 2008: 102–6). Pessoa
cannot be identified by means of the traditional tools of recognition
and representation: he is not; he moves. How does the moment of
communication take place across the series? Here Gil points out that
the disjunctive syntheses are the true machine of innovation in Deleuze’s
thinking of the event (Gil 2008: 18). According to Gil, citing Deleuze’s
critique of Leibniz’s theory of the incompossibles (series 24 in The Logic
of Sense), he is able to offer an innovative concept of disjunction as
the synthetic movement of divergent terms, where the distance between
two inherently different terms is breached not by macroscopic wholes
but by pre-individual singularities (Gil 2008: 20). The connection or
‘ligaçao’ creates difference and introduces variation: this is the Deleuzian
definition of the Event.
From this point onwards (starting from Chapter 5) Gil devotes the
book to a critique of how Deleuze defines the transcendental as the
realm that determines the changing conditions of the possible, and
to the ‘passage’, or the genetic process between the virtual and the
actual. Without this realm, it would be impossible for thought to create
movement beyond common sense and good sense. The whole question
becomes one about how to localise and describe a space for that which
is beyond the organic and the empirical – where the intensities from
Difference and Repetition attest to an ontological-virtual depth. From
the perspective of this task, Gil maintains that prior to Anti-Oedipus
Deleuze had failed to assure univocity of sense through the notion of
‘surface’. With Guattari, and following May ‘68, a second philosophy
emerges. A conceptual evolution in Deleuze’s thought takes place, and
previous concepts are rethought and expanded upon (Gil 2008: 163). It
is worth noting that scholars differ in their identification of the various
turning points in Deleuze’s work. The argument over Deleuze’s change
following his collaborative work with Guattari and the events of May
‘68 is well known. But for James Williams, a significant singularity
appears with Logic of Sense, in which Deleuze experiments ‘with a style
of writing and a more free approach to the tradition [that] break out and
allow novel ideas and a different ethos to guide philosophical thought’
(Williams 2008: 77). However, this sort of ‘identification’ of Deleuze’s
changes of attitude is instructive in itself, and opens up doors for further
analysis and implementation. (It is possible that Deleuze himself would
resist even this attempt to ‘represent’ a passage and the stages used in
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this type of interpretation.) This is in contrast to the genealogies through
which Deleuze’s ‘philosophical perfect origins’ are usually sought.
According to Gil, in Anti-Oedipus and in A Thousand Plateaus, the
surface is replaced by the plane – as the place where sense is engendered.
This plane is what is necessary to provide a basis for the thought of
immanence, and the concept of the body without organs (BwO) starts to
play a major role in its construction. In Anti-Oedipus, the BwO acquires
a precision and consistency that it hadn’t in The Logic of Sense; it is now
the plane of immanence. ‘A whole battery of new concepts describing the
movement of the BwO arises, and it is further developed in A Thousand
Plateaus’ (Gil 2008: 164). The significant change is Deleuze’s incursion
into the social field and history, and the relationship of the latter to
a theory of desire; particularly important is the crossed parallelism
between the production of desire, its inscription and reception, and the
capitalist production and its recording and consumption (Chapters 7
and 8). According to Gil, most important is the convergence between
these two series and the emplacement of the BwO not as a metaphor, but
as the socius itself and the place of becomings: desire is the real, and the
real comprises desire. The convergence between the desiring-production
and the capitalist production is the real. The plane of immanence is
the real and it is of the order of production of desire, of capitalist
production, and of power, or in other words, history is delirium. This is a
new regime of concepts and thought. It is at this point, according to Gil,
that Deleuze and Guattari start to perceive thought itself as immanence
and as life.
Immanence works from within desire. Desire is a force of
composition, an infinite, incessant machine of connection, creation
and agency. When we desire, we are on the BwO. Desire needs a
space or a plane on which it can circulate: this is the BwO. Here Gil
explains Deleuze’s choice for Artaud’s concept, against the organism,
the organised structure. An organism presupposes an organisation of
organs, and it is an obstacle to the intensification of free energy.
For this reason, the un-doing of the organism is a precondition for
the construction of the BwO. It is important to stress that the BwO
is not inhabited by the basic units of empirical life, says Gil. He
elaborates on this further. For example, the BwO of a writer is not
words, but the result of their work on words. Gil maintains that the
point of departure to reach a BwO is our empirical body-organism.
What we have is just an interpretation of the body, ready to be
undone. That is our point of departure in constructing the BwO: our
materials are transformable. It has all the necessary materials to be
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transformed into another body. The BwO is a body of sensations,
and the result of transformation of the empirical body; it lies beyond
the empirical body. It is virtual-real. The transformation has an initial
phase that is negative: here it is necessary to undo the organism, to
combat strata (or opinions); in the second phase we encounter chaos;
and finally, a strategy to form the plane of immanence is adopted
in order to leave chaos.6 The construction of a BwO passes through
these phases, not necessarily in the linear sequence as explained (Gil
2008: 187). What are the three great strata opposing the construction
of the BwO? They are the organism, significance and subjectivity.
Against the organism, Deleuze and Guattari propose disarticulation and
multiplication of articulations; against signification, experimentation;
and against subjectivity – nomadism. There is an important operation
in the stage of dissolution of strata, present through the three strata. It
is the disorganisation of the order of stratification of the internal organs
of a body. In the course of the making of the BwO, we fight against
consistency and return to new forms of it. Consistency is simultaneously
coexistence and conjunction: in order to have consistency, the elements
must be capable of assembly.
Regardless of the nature of the plane, its construction must provide
consistency, necessary for the coexistence of the most diverse
elements . . . because the encounter, the interlacement and the composition
of the heterogeneous as heterogeneous is a first condition of creation and of
intensification of fluxes. (Gil 2008: 184)

In response to the question where are we supposed to find the weapons
(war machines) for the struggle to make a BwO, Gil says that Deleuze
is obscure: he addresses voluntarism and the spontaneity of desire at the
same time (Gil 2008: 199). It is necessary to violentar (to force) the strata
that condition the interior of desire, but it is also necessary to violentar
our thought (Chapter 9). This is why ‘to think is dangerous’:
Because in order to think, it is necessary to destroy the strata of good sense
and common sense – namely, to destroy normalised thought and generalised
opinion; because the philosopher, as the artist, must engage with chaos in
order to cut from it a plane of immanence. To enter into the chaos – into
doubt, into the ‘epoché’ and the vertigo of thought – to leave the doxa of
the ‘natural attitude’, implies imposing violence upon the total of common
existence. (Gil 2008: 221)

The solution resides in the ideas of chance and encounter. We desire,
and leave the strata by virtue of a chance encounter. In a life dominated
by strata, adventure always produces encounters that sprout desire.
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‘All these strategies imply a continuous oscillation between man and
his environment; between external forces and the fluxes of the body;
between the strata and desire . . . It assumes a body that is able to
combine different kinds of energy with its own . . . a body capable of
taking a line of light, of knowing what is best for itself’ (Gil 2008: 200).
A body like this forever finds itself partly beyond the strata and partly
stratified. At this point, in the manner of other Deleuzians wrestling with
the problematic nature of agency, Gil quotes the famous ‘non-recipe’
recipe: ‘This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum,
experiment with the opportunities it offers. . . ’ (Deleuze and Guattari
1987: 161).
Prudence, however, must be adopted to avoid fatally risking ourselves
whilst breaking with the strata of the organism, of significances, and of
subjectivity. This is why Deleuze insists on prudence, Gil reminds us.
According to Gil, ‘prudence is not an attitude or a moral prescription,
but a technique’ (Gil 2008: 188). He considers it a technique of
mastering the struggle against the strata. As Deleuze and Guattari
warn, to be prudent means to conserve ‘small amounts’ of organism,
of signification and subjectivity. But it is a twofold technique, because
those small pieces of strata must be ‘reactivated’ by breaking them every
day. It is a technique that saves us from destruction, while at the same
time bringing about the erosion of the dominant strata. In this way we
must respond to the dominant reality:
To maintain small resources of signification and subjectivity, to reproduce
the codified game of the social networks every morning, and simultaneously
to practice new strategies of struggle, by reproducing the enemy and
experimenting with its efficacy. The deliberate repetition of interpretations
and subjectivities imposed by the dominant order creates a distance in relation
to them and supplies stages on the road to destratification. (Gil 2008: 188)

To what extent is this distance planned and acted upon? How does
knowledge (regarding selection of strata to be repeated or forgotten)
stand here in relation to chance and spontaneity? If it is a distance
between the actual and the virtual, how is unconscious desire accounted
for here? If this distance accounts for the critical turn in reactivating
the strata, then under which conditions does repetition become an
experiment in the beyond? These are perhaps the most troubling
questions regarding agency and activism, and in fact, the scholarly
literature on Deleuze’s thought is mostly mute about them. At the
phase where the debate deals with agency, and like many Deleuzian
scholars before him, Gil is disappointing. His writing lacks the social and
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political landscapes that might enhance the notions of ‘agenciamento’
and prudence, and the roles of the BwO. Expectations are hampered by
abstract language and by literary examples (from Gil’s and Deleuze’s
works) with a narrow spectrum of political implications.
I will conclude with two themes present at the end of Gil’s book:
the function of time in the formation of the plane of immanence
(Chapter 10), and the notion of becoming (Appendix). The time of
immanence is given by the Ritornello (A Thousand Plateaus), explains
Gil. The repetition creates an aperture to a continuation, something that
facilitates orientation and calm – ‘a beginning of order within chaos’.
For example, fieldworks are accompanied with Ritornellos; they work
by tunnelling forces of the body to combine with forces of the land.
The Ritornello creates a space, a territory, in which forces are selected,
combined, joined. It delimits the borders of an internal space, just
as a bird might stake out its territory with its songs. In the end, ‘a
melody becomes a landscape’ (Gil 2008: 232). The micro-dynamics
of the Ritornello goes in this way: the internal forces of the body
must be freed from their biological impulses to allow for expressive
combinations. The Ritornello then disconnects itself from the territory
which enabled it to become expressive, and it is deterritorialised,
acquiring an independent dynamic which allows for new connections
with other forces. How do the heterogeneous elements (heterogeneous
matters of expression, e.g., body and land, artist and colours and canvas)
consolidate? ‘To consolidate (consistency) is not about coexisting in
proximity, but to engage in articulation, to connect’ (Gil 2008: 234).
According to Gil, it is the rhythm of the Ritornello that enables matter
to capture heterogeneous forces. Capture means transformation of the
time of a matter to permit connection with another matter’s time. And
transformation means becoming.
Becoming is a pre-philosophical condition of a thought of immanence.
Becoming is a process of transformation of intensities, and takes place in
a zone of the indiscernible. It is where reciprocal transfer of forces and
intensities occurs across traditional categories. The molecular dynamic:
forces move particles of becoming, creating a relation of movement and
repose, through which micro-parts of the body enter into a zone of
vicinity of the other’s micro-parts. Everything is in a state of becoming,
and we are in a perpetual state of becoming of several types. Even the
most blockaded entity in a stratum emits virtual particles which places
it partially in a plane of immanence. Or, to put it in other way, says Gil,
even the most petrified stratum is transversed by lines of flight through
which molecular becoming escapes.

A Stirring Alphabet of Thought

323

A becoming is not a transformation of form, an ‘identification’ of an ‘I’,
an imitation of a macroscopic figure (molar). It is a microscopic process
(molecular) through which strata are dissolved (with ‘I’ as a stratum of
subjectivity). Between all the kinds, the imperceptible becoming is that which
saves us from paralysing molar capture. (Gil 2008: 258).

This brings us to the title of Gil’s book. The Deleuzian primacy
of the molecular over the molar is there for the purpose of
combating recognition and representation, because the imperceptible,
the indiscernible and the impersonal cannot be recognised or formally
represented (Gil 2008: 260). This is the majestic voice of becoming.
The thought of the molecular brought Deleuze to a molecularisation
of the thought. The molecular is neither a standpoint nor a scale. It is
an objective dimension of the real. To think the real is to think on a
molecular level.7

Notes
1. Translations mine.
2. The torsion of concepts needs to be understood, according to Gil, as Deleuze’s
method of critical thinking based on a special form of negation. Rather than
negating a concept by its mere categorical opposite, Deleuze applies a movement
of critique through which the identity (or the principle) of the foundation (of the
concept under critique) is no more sustained (Gil 2008: 27). By this movement
of torsion a field of difference is finally opened and affirmed, and this affirmation
is in itself the movement of thought. Gil returns to a similar description also for
dualisms.
3. Despite Gil’s commitment to the theme of transcendental empiricism –
articulated by Deleuze from his early writings – it is surprising not to find any
reference to Deleuze’s book on Hume.
4. Following Deleuze, Gil explains that the Idea cannot be represented or
identified. The Idea is a sub-representative virtual multiplicity. Its object is a
problematisation and its state of being is ‘in movement’. There is a complex
field of connection between Ideas. Here the notion of Perplication appears:
the differential interrelation of Ideas (clarity and obscurity). The notion of
Perplication assumes the internal mobility of the Idea.
5. In Chapters 1 and 2 Gil introduces Deleuze’s ontological concepts mainly from
Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense.
6. According to Gil, the same philosophical ‘logic’ is at work in those philosophers
Deleuze wrote against: Plato, Descartes and Husserl (Gil 2008: 201). What
distinguish Deleuze from the metaphysical philosophers is that he is after how
to acquire consistency without lose the infinite where thought is immersed. If
the infinite movement of thought is not stopped – where infinite is the condition
of immanence – explains Gil, then the transcendental cannot be introduced (Gil
2008: 203). ‘Therefore, the first big difference consists in the way we handle
chaos: either it is negated, excluded (as with Descartes), or the movement and
the infinite velocities that animate concepts are extracted from it’ (Gil 2008:
203). The second difference resides in the fact that the circulation of concepts
on the plane of immanence are aleatory; they don’t obey any law, rule or a
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despotic signifier, but only the chance of the encounter – ‘the ideal game of the
eternal return’. There are nomadic movements and not fixed trajectories on a
map in which the territorial distributions are determined by categories; this is a
philosophy of difference in which everything changes (Gil 2008: 203). Then, if
the concept is a movement of thought, how was it possible to handle it as a static
representation?
7. The research and writing of this article was supported by a Marie curie
Intra European Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework
Programme
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